





A Permanent Problem 
Requires a Permanent Solution:
New York City’s Next Affordable Housing Expiring-Use Crisis 
and the Need for Permanent Affordability
Spring 2010
Acknowledgments
ANHD would like to acknowledge Rafael Cestero, Commissioner of the NYC Department 
of Housing Preservation and Development; Marc Jahr, President of the NYC Housing De-
velopment Corporation; and Christine Quinn, Speaker of the New York City Council for 
their efforts to advance this important conversation. 
Additionally, we must thank The Robert Sterling Clark Foundation and especially Laura 
Wolff for their support of this work and commitment to developing public policy that is 
responsive to societal needs and helps improve the lives of low-income New Yorkers. 
i
Table of Contents
Executive Summary                           1
 
Methodology             4
Part I: Total Number of Units Subsidized by the City of New York: 1987-2007    7
                    
Part II:Units At-Risk Because No Permanent Affordability Requirement Exists  10
    
Part III:Moving to a Model that Effectively Creates Housing for the Next Generation 14
    
Conclusion             22
Appendix A: Subsidized Housing by Program and Year: 1987 – 2007    24
     
Appendix B: The Expiration Timeline         28
Appendix C: Key New York City Programs        29




Since it was founded in 1974, the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD), a trade association for neighborhood-based housing groups in New York City, has worked to ensure the long-term affordability of publicly subsidized housing. In the 
1990s, when affordability restrictions that governed thousands of Mitchell-Lama and HUD-
assisted housing units began expiring, ANHD—in partnership with other advocates, preser-
vation purchasers, and all levels of government—started our efforts to preserve these units. 
Informed by this experience, ANHD also has worked aggressively to convince policymakers to 
avoid recreating this expiring-use crisis by changing the way government finances the devel-
opment of affordable housing. Most recently, ANHD has pressed the Paterson and Bloomberg 
administrations to require permanent affordability when public subsidy, tax abatements, or 
state and city land are used to create and preserve affordable housing.  
The Bloomberg administration’s housing program, The New Housing Marketplace Plan, is 
on track to create or preserve 165,000 affordable units by 2014. This commitment is historic 
and represents a tremendous investment of public resources for affordable housing. The plan, 
however, is weak from a sustainability perspective as the overwhelming majority of the units 
developed are only restricted for the length of the financing, which typically lasts 30 years and 
sometimes much less.  Indeed, this flaw means that the city may not be developing housing 
for “the next generation” since for every affordable unit added or preserved, at least one other 
may be lost due to expiring affordability restrictions or loopholes in the state’s rent stabiliza-
tion laws. 
The need to lock in the value of public investment for affordable housing is especially clear giv-
en other noteworthy steps the Bloomberg administration has taken to plan for the city’s long-
term future. For example, PlaNYC 2030, launched on Earth Day 2007, is a comprehensive 
sustainability plan for the city that seeks to maintain and modernize the city’s infrastructure, 
conserve the city’s natural and physical resources, and plan for growth, including the creation 
of homes for one million additional residents.  The reality, however, is that many of the units 
previously developed with city subsidy may no longer be affordable when these future resi-
dents arrive. Thus, it is evident that the goals of PlaNYC and the New Housing Marketplace 
plan be better aligned going forward.   
Although other studies have presented data on the number of federally- and state-subsidized 
units that are in danger of losing their affordability, there is a lack of recognition and under-
standing of the magnitude of at-risk, city-subsidized units.  Therefore, ANHD set out to de-
termine both the total number of city-subsidized units developed between 1987 and 2007, and 
establish how many of those units are at-risk of losing their affordability because of expiring 
regulatory agreements and mortgages. This period covers both Mayor Koch’s original Ten-Year 
Plan that was continued by Mayors Dinkins and Giuliani, and the first four years of the Bloom-
berg Ten-Year plan.
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According to our analysis, 294,402 units were created or preserved with city subsidy over this 
twenty year period. While this is a tremendous accomplishment, 169,561 of these units may be 
at-risk of losing their affordability between 2017 and 2037 due to either expiring affordability 
restrictions or physical deterioration. This total does not include units developed under the 
city’s Inclusionary Housing program, which requires permanence and those units under the 
control of mission-driven not-for-profit owners who are generally committed to maintaining af-
fordability for the life of the building.
The number of at-risk units closely parallels what will be created or preserved under the New 
Housing Marketplace Plan. This potential loss of tens of thousands of units greatly undermines 
the impact of what the Bloomberg administration has done to create and preserve affordable 
housing. Table 1 on Page 12 summarizes these statistics and the methodology for determining 
risk. Interestingly, by 2030, the year in which New York City will reach its moment of greatest 
demand,   over 112,114 rental units will have either gone out of affordability or be at risk of 
doing so. 
Given this looming expiring-use crisis, it is encouraging that the New York City Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) recently announced that it was shifting more of 
the agency’s resources toward housing preservation. The creation of a new Office of Asset and 
Property Management demonstrates that the city is serious about putting some of the pieces 
in place that would help facilitate permanence. 
The details, however, are what truly matters and the city needs to put a plan in place to en-
sure these 169,561 units are preserved over the long term. And most importantly, despite its 
thoughtful consideration of potential strategies to achieve permanence, the agency has not yet 
committed to embracing a comprehensive policy of permanent affordability in either its new 
construction or preservation programs that would ensure the next generation of subsidized 
housing does not face a similar expiring-use crisis. 
ANHD believes that there is a window of opportunity for engaging in discussion and commit-
ting to reshape policy around permanent affordability. The lack of private financing and a 
softer real estate market have increased private developers’ appetites to do affordable projects, 
as well as their receptiveness to longer affordability terms and a return that is driven by fees, 
not the property’s residual value. On the governmental side, the current budget shortfalls fac-
ing the State and City of New York warrant critical and innovative thinking regarding the best 
use of public resources.
In addition to ANHD’s research to determine the number of city-subsidized units at-risk of los-
ing their affordability, we have also been in conversation with housing officials, policy experts 
and housing developers across the country to determine what policies and programs other 
jurisdictions have enacted to enable very long-term and permanent affordability. Numerous 
cities such as Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco have surpassed New York in 
this regard.  
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Two of the various mechanisms that are particularly relevant for New York State and City to 
avoid recreating the expiring-use crisis include:
• Authorizing the state and city to have a “Purchase Option” in any project developed
  on public land, with public subsidy, or benefiting from a tax abatement or zoning 
 density bonus. Such an option would put the fate of these units back in the hands 
 of the public agencies that helped create them.  
• Creating a new property tax abatement and requiring language in future regulatory 
 agreements that would trigger mandatory extension of the project’s affordability 
 restrictions if the abatement is made available when the initial term expires. 
 A corollary recommendation is the initial affordability term should be extended to 
 60 years, which is the maximum period that current abatements permit. 
If these policies were adopted, it would set up a structure that would guarantee subsidized 
units were no longer lost without public review and permission. ANHD hopes this report will 
encourage policymakers to recognize that there is a permanent need for affordable housing 
and to realize that permanent affordability restrictions are a cost-effective, efficient means to 
ensure that New York no longer has to create and recreate the same unit of affordable housing 
over and over again.
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Methodology
In order to establish an expiration timeline, ANHD analyzed data received from HPD through a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request  and publicly available data  from HDC about the number of new and rehabilitated units completed every year between 1987 
and 2007 by the respective agencies. While the city usually reports on the number of unit starts 
for the purpose of counting assisted units, it was crucial to get the data on completions since 
this is when the “clock starts ticking” for how long the project must remain affordable. 
Although we calculate in Part I the total number of city-subsidized units – both homeowner-
ship and rental – between 1987 and 2007, for the purpose of establishing the potential number 
of at-risk units, the report focuses on those units developed or preserved under the city’s vari-
ous multifamily rental  housing programs. For both practical and policy purposes, the at-risk 
analysis does not factor in homeownership units nor rental units that are governed by federal 
or state regulations despite being built on city land or having some city subsidy.  
Units Not Included in “At-Risk” Analysis
Homeownership units were excluded for several reasons. First, the city’s homeownership 
programs have uneven resale restrictions and utilize complicated evaporating lien formulas, 
which would make it difficult to determine when the sales price was no longer affordable. In 
theory, low-, moderate-, and middle-income homebuyers purchased homes at below-market 
prices, used them as their primary residences for several years and were then free to sell at 
unrestricted prices. In reality, a lack of rigorous oversight and the private nature of these 
transactions have enabled many of these homes to trade at market prices long before the resale 
restrictions expire. Despite recent steps to monitor and 
encourage longer-term affordability, many stories have 
chronicled how selection to participate in these programs 
has been equivalent to winning the lottery since owners 
had the right to buy at a subsidized price and essentially 
flip the property for a substantial gain. 
Another reason why homeownership units were excluded 
was several programs failed to require affordability from 
the outset. For example, HPD’s StoreWorks program, which is intended to rehabilitate small, 
vacant, mixed-use buildings owned by the city and restore them to private ownership, sets the 
sales price at market levels and does not establish income limits for buyers nor any price or 
income limits for renters of apartments or stores. Between 1999 and 2007, StoreWorks sub-
sidized the creation of 284 units of housing. The buildings generally consist of a storefront at 
street level and one to eight apartments above. Rehabilitation of these buildings is enabled 
by loans from private lenders as well as partial financing from HPD. The city also provides a 
partial tax abatement for a period of 20 years. Despite the substantial public cost of subsidiz-
ing these units, there are no upfront affordability guidelines and only limited restrictions on 
resale profits. 
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The number of at-risk units 
closely parallels what will 
be created or preserved 
under the New Housing 
Marketplace Plan.
Also, as detailed in an audit conducted by the New York City Comptroller’s Office, HPD did not 
even set income restrictions for one third of the initial households in the Cornerstone Program 
since the goal was only to encourage private development of housing on city owned land.   
Because of the design of the StoreWorks and Cornerstone programs, many policymakers have 
not only called for greater oversight and enforcement of resale restrictions, but also for the city 
to move toward a shared equity model for its homeownership programs to achieve a greater 
balance between public investment and private gain. While the need for the city to revisit its 
philosophy regarding subsidized homeownership is clear, the research in this report focuses 
exclusively on city-subsidized rental programs. 
Units governed by state or federal regulations were excluded because their continued afford-
ability is largely out of the city’s hands. In all, excluding these units from our analysis may 
underestimate the true number of units that are at-risk and the resources required to preserve 
them since the city may be called on to intervene across all programs.
Determining Risk Factors for Subsidized, Rental Units
While Part I focuses on the total number of units subsidized by the City of New York over the 
twenty year period, Part II details how many of the eligible units—rental units built on city 
land and subsidized with city capital—have expiring-use restrictions.
According to a report on the impact of New York City’s first Ten-Year Plan, one of the Koch 
administration’s primary goals was to address the shortage of affordable rental housing.  How-
ever, it is important to acknowledge that not all programs under the Koch Plan were designed 
with affordable rents in mind per se. Many programs, especially those that targeted proper-
ties that had been neglected or even abandoned due to extremely weak market conditions, 
were primarily concerned with improving the physical condition of the properties to ensure the 
health and safety of residents were not endangered. Furthermore, as communities struggled 
with de-population, disinvestment, and crime, these programs were intended merely to retain 
residents. Although the assisted units were required to remain rent regulated, the city was 
generally not concerned with expiring affordability. Some have pointed out that the degree to 
which rents have risen would have been an unexpected and positive development to those who 
administered these early programs. 
That being said, no matter the original intent of the program, the reality is that the property’s 
mortgage will come due and the regulatory agreement governing the affordability of these 
projects will expire, thereby putting the property’s affordability at risk. Thus, ANHD’s analysis 
does not distinguish between programs based on initial intent and considers all of these units 
to be “at risk.” 
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Additionally, the analysis distinguished between units owned by for-profit and not-for-profit 
owners. Although it is important to recognize that there are many mission-driven for-profits 
who have long track records of being committed to affordable housing, all for-profit owners—to 
a certain degree—factor a property’s long-term appreciation into their investment strategy in 
a way that not-for-profits simply do not. 
Therefore, the assumption was made that all for-profit owners will take their project out of 
affordability at some point after the restrictions expire and should therefore be considered “at-
risk.” Not-for-profit units, conversely, were excluded from the analysis because they will likely 
remain affordable in perpetuity. 
Moreover, it is likely that the expiration of the mortgage term and regulatory agreement and 
type of owner are not the only factors that put a project’s affordability at-risk. Indeed, whether 
a property is located in a desirable neighborhood, is covered under rent regulation, or is de-
veloped with tax credits, which have more rigorous monitoring, are all likely to be relevant. 
However, these criteria were outside the scope of this research given data and time constraints. 
By examining programmatic regulations, regulatory agreements, and the financing sources, it 
was possible to estimate when units will be at risk of going out of affordability. Overall, ANHD 
focused its analysis on 67 programs that provide multifamily rental housing to New Yorkers 
across the five boroughs. While this large number of programs represents an alphabet soup of 
acronyms, the majority of city-subsidized units fall into a dozen or so programs. 
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Part I: Total Number of Units Subsidized by the City of New York
Between 1987 and 2007, the City of New York, through its Department of Housing Pres-ervation and Development (HPD) and Housing Development Corporation (HDC), sub-sidized the preservation and creation of approximately 294,402 units of affordable 
housing.  The city—despite dozens of different programs and innovations—utilized essentially 
the same financing model over the entire period: in exchange for subsidized mortgages, rent 
subsidies, incentive zoning, and tax abatements, which guaranteed a modest return, private 
developers agreed to build much-needed housing in all-affordable or mixed income projects. 
Although this model has been effective at attracting private development of affordable hous-
ing, it has also given rise to the looming expiring use crisis that threatens to undermine this 
tremendous public investment.
Of these 294,402 subsidized units, about 80 percent were developed by HPD and 20 percent 
were assisted by HDC. Beginning in 2004, however, there was a shift and HDC became respon-
sible for a much greater share of the units. Indeed, between 2004 and 2007, HDC became the 
lead agency and was responsible for just over 50 percent of the 67,934 units that were either 
created or preserved. The principal reason behind this shift is that the Bloomberg administra-
tion, in a clever move, authorized HDC to use its sizable corporate reserves to provide substan-
tial second mortgages. To achieve maximum impact, this means that any proposal to require 
permanent affordability must also be applied to HDC’s programs.
For a summary of the number of units preserved and created by year and program between 
1987 and 2007, see Appendix A.
Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD)
During this 20-year period, HPD subsidized the preservation or creation of 235,020 units of 
affordable housing. These units can be divided into two main categories:
 1) Preservation: 200,557 units
 2) New Construction: 34,463 units
In other words, over 85 percent of the HPD-subsidized units between 1987 and 2007 were those 
that needed some form of preservation. Of these preserved units, 74.3 percent (148,995 units) 
were classified as moderate rehabilitations and 25.7 percent (51,562 units) were gut rehabilita-
tions. Mod rehabs tended to be for properties that were privately owned and occupied.  On the 
other hand, gut rehabs were typical for vacant buildings the city had taken ownership of and 
whose condition had deteriorated much more substantially.  In terms of rental units versus 
homeownership, the vast majority (85.5 percent) were multifamily rental housing.
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Housing Development Corporation (HDC)
Between 1987 and 2007, HDC subsidized the preservation and creation of approximately 
59,382 units.  The majority of these units fell under two primary categories:
   1) Mitchell-Lama Preservation: 18,195 units
   2) New Construction (including LAMP, New Hop, Coop Housing, and 80/20): 41,187 units
Since information is not available prior to 2004 regarding the number of HDC units that were 
preserved versus created, it is difficult to document the overall mix. 
As it is widely known, the need to focus on preservation was a result of the city taking owner-
ship of over 100,000 units through in rem foreclosure proceedings, which were triggered when 
private owners fell into tax arrears. Not surprisingly, these properties suffered from consider-
able neglect and mismanagement. Further complicating the city’s response was the reality 
that many of the properties were occupied by the poorest households in the city. Thus, many 
programs were designed to respond to the economic needs of these tenants and focused on pre-
serving the units as low-income rental housing. Although new construction was a key tool in 
expanding the supply of affordable housing, the higher cost and relative lack of available sites 
means it has been responsible for a much lower percentage of subsidized units.
Cost and Financing Model
Over the 20-year period, New York City has spent approximately $7.64 billion on the preserva-
tion and creation of affordable housing.  These funds have come from several sources including 
bond proceeds, the city’s capital budget, HDC’s corporate reserves, and the state and federal 
governments. This substantial investment is both notable and central to the availability of 
safe, affordable housing given the federal government’s declining commitment to urban hous-
ing programs.  It is important to note that while some of the programs initially had very 
modest per unit subsidies, within a few years the amount grew substantially. Alex Schwartz, 
Associate Professor and Chair of Policy Programs at Milano The New School for Management 
and Urban Policy, points out that the per unit capital com-
mitment was $8,400 in 1987 but grew to over $30,000 per 
unit just five years later. 
According to an article published in The Manhattan Insti-
tute’s Civic Bulletin, the city’s gap finance approach to sub-
sidizing the capital and operating needs of a building was 
somewhat atypical, but ultimately very effective in getting 
tens of thousands of units online.  The gap finance model works like this: the city would first de-
termine the cost of a project, the amount of equity the owner could contribute and the amount 
of private debt the project could support based on market conditions and the rent-paying abil-
ity of current tenants. The difference between the cost of the rehab or new construction and 
the sum of equity and private market debt would be filled with city financing, typically in the 
form of nominal interest rate mortgage loans. Generally, the amount of gap financing in the 
project’s deal was greater than either the equity or private loan, which means the city was (and 
8
Over the 20-year period, 
New York City has spent 
$7.64 billion to preserve 
and create affordable 
housing. 
is) in position to enforce the restrictions governing the property’s use and affordability. Although it 
is unclear at this time what will happen when the restrictions expire, it is clear that the city will 
play a key role in determining the property’s continued affordability.    
Key Programs
Appendix C includes a brief summary of the HPD and HDC programs responsible for a 
great share of these city-subsidized affordable units. Two programs that historically have 
accounted for more than one-quarter of all units developed, Article 8a Loan Program and 
Participation Loan Program (PLP), remain core initiatives utilized by HPD. All four of the 
HDC programs discussed are current initiatives. For each program, there is a description 
that highlights the type of housing built, the term of the financing, and the income level 
of households served by the program, if applicable. This is followed by the total number 
of units developed over the 20-year period, the percentage of the respective agencies’ total 
units developed under the program, and the percentage of the overall number of city-
subsidized units that fall under the program. Focusing our attention on these specific pro-
grams will help crystallize where the city should prioritize its attention for programmatic 
reform in order to have the greatest preservation impact. 
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Part II: Units At-Risk Because No Permanent Affordability 
Requirement Exists
Again, according to our analysis, 294,402 units were developed over this 20-year period, which includes Mayor Koch’s Ten-Year plan, the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations, and the first four years of Mayor Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan. As it was 
noted in the Methodology section, we omitted homeownership units and those developed under 
state and federal programs from the analysis. Once these reductions were made, the relevant 
number for determining how many units may be at-risk of losing their affordability is 234,508 
or almost 80 percent of all subsidized units. However, as we began to analyze the various city 
housing programs, it became clear that the universe of at-risk units should be reduced further 
because of two types of housing.
Mitigating Factors that Lessen the Risk of Losing Affordable Homes
The first type of housing that is unlikely to be at-risk of losing its affordability is housing devel-
oped under the Inclusionary Housing program.  According to the Department of City Planning, 
the Inclusionary program “combines a zoning floor area bonus with a variety of housing sub-
sidy programs to create powerful incentives for the development and preservation of affordable 
housing. Developments taking advantage of the full bonus in the new program must devote at 
least 20 percent of their residential floor area to hous-
ing that will remain permanently affordable to lower-
income households.”  Thus, the 1,164 units developed 
under the Inclusionary program should not be consid-
ered to be at-risk. Remarkably, however, this means 
that less than one percent of the 294,402 units subsi-
dized with city resources over this twenty year period 
are required to be permanently affordable. 
The other significant factor that we believe could reduce the number of at-risk units is not-for-
profit ownership. Of the 234,508 rental units subsidized by the city between 1987 and 2007, 
approximately 63,783 units (27.2 percent) were developed by not-for-profits.  Because not-for-
profit developers are driven by their mission to maintain the affordability of units under their 
control, it is important to recognize this important distinction in ownership when analyzing 
the true threat to the city’s affordable housing stock. Thus, after reducing the units developed 
under the Inclusionary program and those developed by not-for-profits, the universe of afford-
able housing at risk of becoming unaffordable between 2017 and 2037 is reduced from 234,508 
units to 169,561 units. This analysis is summarized in Table 1 on the next page. 
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Less than 1% of the 294,402 
units subsidized with city 
resources over this 20 year 
period are required to be 
permanently affordable. 
  Table 1.        New York City Subsidized Housing: 1987 to 2007
 
 1987 - 2007
 
 Total City-Subsidized Units (HPD + HDC) 294,402
   
 Total Homeownership -45,517
 Total Storeworks  -284
 Total State / Federal -14,093
   
 Total City-Subsidized Rental Units Eligible for Loss 234,508
   
 Total Inclusionary Units -1,164
 Total City-Subsidized Rental Units Developed by Not-for-Profits -63,783
 
 Total At-Risk 169,561
     (by 2037)
Although they are important first steps, simply mandating permanent affordability, as in the 
case of Inclusionary Housing, or partnering with mission-driven developers, does not preclude 
a loss of affordable units.  New York State and City should make recapitalization resources 
available and have a rigorous asset management system in place that is able to respond force-
fully to the challenges of disinvestment and deferred maintenance.  Indeed, a commitment 
from the state and city that recapitalization would be available if permanent affordability is 
mandated going forward is desired by both not-for-profit and for-profit developers 
What’s Really At-Risk and When
With a greater understanding of the universe of units facing expiration of affordability restric-
tions, it is necessary to determine when the moment of greatest threat will be based on the 
various factors impacting a project’s affordability. This is possible by examining the program 
guidelines, regulatory agreements, and financing sources attached to the city’s housing pro-
grams. ANHD has summarized these findings in Appendix B: The Expiration Timeline, which 
details the number of units at-risk by year. As the timeline illustrates, the first units will be 
eligible to go to market beginning in 2017—thirty years after they were developed.
Overall, of the 234,508 city-subsidized rental units developed by the City of New York between 
1987 and 2007, 169,561 units (72.3 percent) will be at-risk of losing their affordability by 2037 
because of maturing mortgages and regulatory agreements. Between 2017 and 2037, the larg-
est number of units (18,537) will be at-risk of losing their affordability in 2020—less than ten 
years from now. In 2017, the first year these units will technically be at risk, restrictions will 
expire for over 12,000 units. 
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Although Mayor Bloomberg deserves credit for establishing his PlaNYC 2030 initiative, there 
is a disconnect between his housing program and the goals of his sustainability plan. Indeed, 
by 2030, the year in which New York City will reach its moment of greatest demand, 112,114 
rental units may be lost already. Table 2 summarizes the process for determining this universe 
of at-risk units. 
        Table 2.                    New York City Subsidized Housing: 1987 to 2000
  
 1987 - 2000
 
 Total City-Subsidized Units (HPD + HDC) 193,038
   
 Total Homeownership -27,951
 Total Storeworks  -72
 Total State / Federal -9,883
   
 Total City-Subsidized Rental Units Eligible for Loss 155,132
   
 Total Inclusionary Units -324
 Total City-Subsidized Rental Units Developed by Not-for-Profits -42,694
 
 Total At-Risk 112,114 
(by 2030)
ANHD believes this estimate of at-risk units underestimates the true number of units that are 
in jeopardy and the resources required to preserve them. This is because we do not account 
for homeownership units nor units subsidized with both city and non-city resources, and it is 
reasonable to expect that the city may well be called on to intervene financially across these 
programs as well.  
Moreover, it is possible that some of the units have already gone out of affordability due to 
shorter terms and a lack of adequate oversight. For example, HDC’s Mitchell-Lama Preserva-
tion Program has a much shorter affordability term than most preservation programs. In order 
to incentivize owners to remain in the Mitchell-Lama program, HDC offers a capital repair 
loan that is co-terminus with the first mortgage. 
In exchange for this low-cost loan, the borrower must commit to remain in the Mitchell-Lama 
Program for the duration of the term of the loan, typically 15 to 18 years, or a minimum of 10 
years. There is also a strong possibility that many owners, especially those who own properties 
not financed with tax credits, are renting to households who earn more than program require-
ments allow without the city’s knowledge.   
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Given the tremendous time, resources, and tools need-
ed to preserve these units, it is necessary to develop a 
comprehensive strategy now. 
Equally important, the city must embrace a new model 
of subsidized housing development to ensure we do not 
recreate this problem with the affordable housing units 
currently being produced or preserved.
 
Of the 234,508 city-subsi-
dized rental units developed 
between 1987 and 2007, 
169,561 units (72.3%) will be 
at-risk of losing their afford-
ability by 2037.
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Part III: Moving to a Model that Effectively Creates Housing 
for the Next Generation
As the economics of development in New York City have changed during the last decade, development of affordable housing has rarely occurred without government subsidy.  In exchange for public resources that guaranteed a reasonable return on their investment, 
private developers agreed to build much-needed housing in all-affordable or mixed-income 
projects. As previously noted, this investment is slipping away as affordability restrictions ex-
pire and owners take the units to market. 
Indeed, the loss of thousands of units of Mitchell-Lama and project-based Section 8 housing 
due to expiring affordability and the unknown fate of large projects like Stuy-Town / Peter 
Cooper Village have raised public awareness of the expiring affordability problem. However, 
until now, there has been little, if any, recognition that tens of thousands of units that were cre-
ated under city programs are also at risk of becoming unaffordable. And Mayor Bloomberg has 
failed to adapt both production and preservation financing models, models which were created 
under markedly different market conditions, to ensure the city is achieving maximum public 
benefit for its precious public resources. Thus, the issue of expiring affordability is incredibly 
timely and one that warrants significant attention from the State and City of New York. 
Mechanisms to Enable Permanence
Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach to permanence, the consensus among many 
in the affordable housing community is that permanent affordability must be embraced as a 
core principle that guides all publicly subsidized housing projects. A primary factor driving 
this thinking is permanence makes for a more rational investment of taxpayer dollars. Fur-
thermore, there are many financing and regulatory tools that have been utilized successfully 
in localities across the country that can be applied to achieve permanent affordability here. 
Many of these tools were discussed at a national con-
vening attended by housing officials, policy experts, 
practitioners, and advocates from across the country 
that ANHD hosted at the Ford Foundation in Octo-
ber 2009. In addition to incorporating these various 
mechanisms into its toolbox, the city and state must 
both recognize the importance of asset management 
to securing the long-term viability of projects and 
requiring and incentivizing developers to opt-in to 
longer term affordability.
There are many financing 
and regulatory tools that 
have been utilized success-
fully in localities across the 
country that can be applied 
to achieve permanent 
affordability here. 
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Requirement for Public Financing and Tax Abatements
As public investment has become a larger part of initial development and/or recapitalization 
needs for affordable housing, the argument for protecting this investment by requiring very 
long-term or permanent affordability has also intensified. 
Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have taken a quid pro quo approach to projects funded with 
public subsidies - such as capital dollars, bond proceeds, and tax credits - that trades public 
resources for permanence. 
Boston now requires that any rental housing that receives subsidies from the city have a re-
corded covenant that ensures affordability in perpetuity. Prior to this, the term was set at 30 
years. City-sponsored homeownership projects have a 
50-year affordability covenant, with an option to renew 
for another 20 years at the end of the term.  Boston 
is also leveraging longer-term regulatory concessions 
for market-driven projects that are not city subsidized, 
but require other types of city approvals and support. 
In San Francisco, affordability requirements evolved 
from standard 15- or 30-year agreements to more than 50-year commitments as the city’s mon-
etary contribution increased in size.  As of January 2008, California, through its Community 
Redevelopment Law (CRL), now requires that any new rental project financed with tax incre-
ment funds commit to a 55-year affordability period (45-years for homeownership).  This 55-
year standard has also been adopted by the state’s Tax Credit Allocation Committee, which 
administers the state’s Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) allocation.  With such a prior-
ity set at the state level, local agencies have a solid precedent in place to require the 55-year 
commitment through their own affordable housing programs. This commitment to longer-term 
affordability has also extended to programs offered in Los Angeles, and in California’s rural 
housing programs as well. 
In New York City, most of HPD’s current regulatory agreements are set at the 30-year mark for 
new construction rental projects. There is less consistency across the city’s preservation rental 
programs. One concrete step the city could take to improve its return on investment is to make 
60-year affordability a threshold requirement for projects applying for LIHTCs.  
Financing terms, tax incentives, and other aspects of the regulatory agreement should be de-
veloped that match this affordability term. Indeed, in the majority of affordable housing deals, 
property tax exemptions and abatements are powerful incentives for developers. As the State 
and City of New York develop their strategies for permanent affordability, it is important to 
acknowledge that property tax incentives are one of the most powerful tools local government 
has, providing substantial leverage to ensure affordability. One idea would be to require a 
project’s initial affordability term mandatorily be extended for a similar length of time should 
the state or city continue to abate the project’s property taxes. When utilizing tax abatements 
as a means of enabling longer-term affordability, it is essential that these incentives are only 
Boston now requires that 
any rental housing city-sub-
sidized have a recorded 
covenant that ensures 
affordability in perpetuity.
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available to the below-market units. While permanent affordability may be a worthwhile goal 
in and of itself, we must remember that its value is rooted primarily in fiscal efficiency, not in 
its potential to further enrich developers through generous tax breaks.
Option to Purchase 
One of the most significant risks to current affordable housing projects is that at the end of the 
regulatory period, owners may exercise a number of options that could prove detrimental to 
the affordability of subsidized units. Owners may 1) leave the program and sell the property on 
the open market or 2) prepay the mortgage early and either sell the units at market-rate prices 
or convert them to market-rate rentals while retaining ownership. As the Community Service 
Society demonstrates in its “Closing the Door” series, tens of thousands of affordable housing 
units have been lost this way.   Nowhere has this been more clearly an issue than in New York’s 
Mitchell-Lama program, which encompasses both rental and co-op apartments for low, moder-
ate, and middle-income families.  It has also proved critical for LIHTC projects built before the 
program’s extended-use regulations, which mandate 30-year instead of 15-year affordability 
restrictions, went into effect in 1990 and for project-based Section 8 housing reaching contract 
expiration dates.
A number of jurisdictions have determined that a clearly defined “Option to Purchase” mecha-
nism can put the fate of these units back in the hands of the public agencies that helped cre-
ate them. Implementing this course of action as an option rather than a mandate gives public 
agencies the flexibility they need to make timely, appropriate decisions sensitive to communi-
ties, budgets and political environments.
In San Francisco, the Redevelopment Agency has utilized its Option to Purchase to acquire 
almost 1,800 of units of project-based Section 8 housing, extend their affordability, and trans-
fer ownership to not-for-profit owners. The agency has committed over $55 million in capital 
money and $90 million in bond proceeds to ensure these affordable housing resources are not 
lost. San Francisco has been incredibly successful in preserving 
its Section 8 properties and credits the Option to Purchase for 
facilitating transfer of these properties to preservation-minded 
purchasers at a price that reflects continued affordability. 
Interestingly, the city has not actually evoked its Option, but 
rather used it as a way to start negotiations with private own-
ers. This model may be particularly attractive to the City of 
New York since it would give the city greater enforcement and 
negotiating power to acquire the properties at less than fair 
market value. 
Additionally, San Francisco’s housing agencies generally have 
an expectation that in most tax credit projects the Managing 
General Partner (often a nonprofit) will exercise the standard 




Agency has utilized 
its Option to Purchase 
to acquire almost 
1,800 of units of proj-
ect-based Section 8 
housing, extend their 
affordability, and 
transfer ownership to 
not-for-profit owners.
has been born out in practice. In addition, the agency does have Right of First Refusal agree-
ments on some 100 percent affordable bond deals that do not have soft loans.  
Research conducted for ANHD’s groundbreaking report “Roadmap to Affordability”  showed 
that California state law prohibits owners of assisted housing developments from terminating 
a subsidy contract or prepaying the mortgage unless the owner gives a one-year notice of in-
tent and provides “qualified entities” the opportunity to submit an offer to purchase.  Qualified 
entities must agree to maintain the property as affordable for 30 years or the remaining term 
of the existing federal government assistance, whichever is greater.  In the first 180 days the 
owner may only consider offers from these qualified entities.  
In December 2009, Massachusetts passed an “Act Preserving Publicly Assisted Housing,” 
which requires the owner of a publicly assisted affordable housing development to: provide 
written notice to all tenants, the Mayor of the affected municipality, numerous public agen-
cies, and a leading advocacy organization not less than two years before the termination of 
the property’s affordability restrictions; give the state housing agency or its designee a right 
of first offer before the owner of a publicly assisted property enters into a contract to sell such 
property; and grant a right of first refusal to the state housing agency or its designee upon 
execution of a third-party purchase-and-sale agreement regarding such publicly assisted hous-
ing. There are also protections for low-income tenants residing in the housing on the date of 
termination of the affordability restrictions who do not receive enhanced Section 8 vouchers.   
Additionally, Massachusetts’ projects that receive resources from the Housing Stability Fund 
are governed by an Affordable Housing Restriction that runs with the land. Once this restric-
tion expires, the local jurisdiction has an Option to Purchase at the appraised value less the 
outstanding balance of principal and interest. If the owner tries to sell before the expiration 
of the Affordable Housing Restriction, the jurisdiction has the right to purchase at the same 
price as the bona fide offer. Additionally, Massachusetts state law requires owners of assisted 
developments to provide a two-year notice of intent prior to expiration or termination.  
A second notice is then required not less than one year prior to completion of termination. 
Owners must first provide the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment (MDHCD) the opportunity to purchase the property.  While the owner is not obligated 
to take the MDHCD offer, the agency has the ability to extend its option to another entity such 
as a nonprofit or other owner who will commit to keeping the units affordable.  If no offer is 
made within 90 days the owner may sell to a third party without conditions.  However, the 
Department or their designee may counteroffer within 90 days to match the price.  
Under Vermont law, the Housing Finance Agency secures an Option to Purchase and a com-
mitment to extend the affordability of apartments should rental assistance be available at the 
expiration of the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment contract, in exchange for allowing an 
increased return on equity and access to cash and loans. Vermont’s preservation decisions are 
guided by a commitment to secure the longest term of affordability in exchange for public re-
sources. Additionally, owners are forbidden from opting-out of state subsidy programs.
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Portland, Oregon and Denver, Colorado, have passed Affordable Housing Preservation Ordi-
nances. While the respective cities are not obligated to purchase an at-risk property, they have 
an opportunity to decide whether or not a preservation transaction makes sense based on eco-
nomics, replacement costs, project location, and the owner’s willingness to sell at less than fair 
market value. For example, the City of Portland facilitated the sale of the Clay Towers apart-
ments to the Cedar Sinai Partnership at a price that would enable continued affordability. 
To date, New York City has not employed a Purchase Option or a Right of First Refusal.  How-
ever, there seems to be support among key city officials for Purchase Options as a promising tool 
since they put control in the hands of the city and allow for ongoing evaluation and flexibility. It 
is important to note that Purchase Options could be an effective tool for preserving affordability 
not only when the affordability term expires or when the owner proposes to prepay the mort-
gaged, but also in the case of physical deterioration. For new projects developed going forward, 
Purchase Options could amount to a claw back provision that allows the city to intervene before 
the restrictions expire if the property is not well maintained. A system would need to be put in 
place where the city could exercise its Option—possibly triggered by a certain amount of serious 
housing code violations—and transfer the property to a responsible owner.      
ANHD believes Purchase Options must be a key component to any strategy the State and City 
of New York put forward regarding permanent affordability. Not only do Purchase Options 
ensure the public sector has the final say in a whether or not a project remains affordable, 
they also send a signal that the government views these properties as investments that must 
be protected. Although both Options to Purchase and Rights of Refusal are aimed at the same 
objective, there is consensus that a Right of First Refusal is not as strong a mechanism as an 
Option to Purchase, which exhibits a more specific intent and procedure for keeping these proj-
ects affordable.   
 
Land Leases and Land Trusts
In any housing project, land represents both significant cost and significant value for the devel-
oper.  And where land is scarce, the land itself as well as zoning actions that increase density 
equal enhanced leverage for the local jurisdiction.  A number of jurisdictions have been able to 
use this leverage to their advantage in both securing longer-term affordability and generating 
additional cash flow to be reinvested in affordable housing.
San Francisco has balanced up-front costs and future preservation needs by purchasing land 
from developers and then leasing it back in lieu of providing a loan for acquisition.  The city 
began this practice after discovering that many of the projects in their Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) and Section 8 programs that were near the end of their affordability restriction 
periods and at risk of opting out were built on city land initially sold to developers at consider-
ably lower per unit costs.  As the value of the land grew, the cost per unit had increased signifi-
cantly, leading to higher preservation costs.  
18
The new Land Lease structure has placed greater control in the hands of the agency and gener-
ated a number of positive results for affordable housing, including:
•An initial affordability term of 55 years, with a 45-year additional extension. 
  This additional extension automatically renews if improvements remain affordable; 
• The developer owns the improvements but the city controls the land; 
•Base and residual rents allow the city to sweep excess cash out of the transaction while 
  still having increasing debt based on a soft loan.
Base land rents are determined based on 10 percent of the land value and the nature of the 
building.  For instance, a base rent for buildings serving homeless people can be as little as 
$1, whereas rent for a project-based Section 8 building could be between $15,000 and $20,000. 
Base rent is paid prior to any soft loans.  Residual rent is paid annually, based on what the 
building cash flow can support.  
In this scenario, lenders have been willing to finance these types of deals because of the lender 
protections that San Francisco has built in.  For instance, an uncured default on the lease-
hold would result in market-rate housing in the leasehold and the land lease payment would 
increase to market value. The city has also been able to negotiate with lenders for no encum-
brances on the fee, only on the leasehold.  
In the area of affordable homeownership, Chicago’s Department of Community Development 
(CDCD) has created the country’s first citywide Land Trust as a mechanism to assure long-term 
affordability.  Launched in 2005, the Chicago Community Land Trust was created to preserve 
affordability in what were then “hot market” neighborhoods where land values were likely to 
increase.  The land parcels held in the Trust come with a 99-year affordability covenant and are 
used as an integral part of the city’s inclusionary housing initiatives.  The city was able to suc-
cessfully negotiate with the Tax Assessor’s Office to assess the properties as affordable units, 
and not at the standard market values.  While now facing a “down” real estate market, Chicago 
is still committed to harness new affordability with this program.  
For both historical factors and statutory limits, New York City does not yet have a legacy of 
Land Lease agreements.  Since the days of extensive in rem property holdings, the city has 
had a strategic goal of divesting itself of property ownership. That being said, there is at least 
one example of the city partnering with the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and 
the not-for-profit Phipps Houses to develop two adjacent sites in East Harlem.  Phipps has 
leased the two properties from NYCHA with a 99-year covenant for affordability.  In addition, 
NYCHA has committed a significant number of individual Section 8 vouchers to help keep the 
building affordable and provide guaranteed cash flow for the project. HPD’s extension of the 
project’s 420c tax incentive, which provides a 100 percent Real Estate Tax abatement for the 
life of the regulatory agreement or 60 years (whichever is greater) also supports the financial 
viability and longer-term of affordability in this particular project. Overall, HPD should revisit 
its aversion to land leases and look at the model as part of the agency’s ongoing policy work on 




The underwriting process represents a key phase in the consideration of policies that support 
permanent affordability.  Project pro formas should look for ways to set up the project from the 
outset for long-term financial and physical stability. The willingness to underwrite the mar-
ginally higher up-front expense for this substantial future benefit supports a commitment to 
making the project work even beyond the initial regulatory period and can provide savings at 
the point of recapitalization or preservation.  Including more substantial up-front replacement 
reserves also serves this same goal when incorporated in the underwriting process.
One specific up-front investment that could have a 
positive impact in the long run would be allowing for 
asset management resources to appear as an expense 
“above the line” in the project’s maintenance and op-
erations budget. Given the importance of stewardship 
in realizing permanent affordability, resources for this 
function should be considered part of the development 
cost. 
Rigorous Asset Management
Asset Management is a function that cannot be overlooked if the goal is to achieve permanent 
affordability. Whether the entity is a public agency, a nonprofit property manager or a private 
owner, solid asset management provides the opportunity for any necessary early interventions 
for funding or other support.  Furthermore, It lets owner, government, and other stakeholders 
know when a project is at-risk, and proactively addresses such risk.
There seems to be agreement across the spectrum of stakeholders involved in affordable hous-
ing development and management that greater emphasis be placed on asset management. Of 
course, resources are limited and there is often both tremendous political pressure and sub-
stantial public need to devote resources to the creation of new housing. Nonetheless, public 
agencies have a duty to invest in asset management at multiple levels – in their own staff as 
well as their development partners’ staff capacity.  Without well-trained staff who have knowl-
edge of the property’s physical and fiscal health and are aware of enforcement mechanisms, 
regulatory protections become worthless. 
Boston has also made a significant investment in asset management with a database for at-
risk projects.  Using specifically developed criteria, projects are assessed and prioritized for 
additional investment where needed.  The system is used collaboratively among agencies to 
work with individual developers to create a strategy that will extend affordability.  To date this 
process has been very successful in preserving the current stock of assisted affordable housing. 
Agencies and advocates are now engaged in conversations with the State of Massachusetts to 
extend the system to include state-sponsored projects as well.
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One concrete step the city 
could take to improve its re-
turn on investment is mak-
ing 60-year affordability a 
threshold requirement for 
projects applying for LIHTCs.
New York City should be commended for the steps it has taken to increase investment in asset 
management. Beginning in 2008, HPD began construction of an internal database which will 
be a useful tool for tracking various building indicators. 
Also, Commissioner Cestero recently announced the creation of a new Office of Asset and Prop-
erty Management that will focus exclusively on this area. The office will be engaging those in 
the field in order to gain perspective and set the agenda moving forward. And HDC seems to be 
one step ahead, as a quarter of its staff is dedicated to asset management. Finally, the four state 
and city housing agencies have formed an Interagency Working Group that meets regularly to 
discuss at-risk properties and possible strategies for preserving them as affordable housing.
All of these various mechanisms have proven effective in localities across the country. New 
York State and City must learn from these successful strategies and become a national leader 




Affordable housing remains one of the foremost challenges here in New York City. Ever since 
Mayor Koch’s first ten-year housing plan, we have recognized the important role the city, state, 
and federal government play in ensuring New York remains a vibrant and economically diverse 
city, and affordable to people from all income levels and walks of life.  Since 1987, we have had 
an amazing record of success – developing almost 300,000 affordable housing units and revital-
izing entire neighborhoods.
Today, however, we confront a new problem: how to ensure this success does not slip away. 
Slowly but surely, we are starting to move backward as we lose affordable housing units at a 
higher rate than we are gaining them. Unaddressed, this trickle will soon turn into a flood.    
Now is the time to start moving forward on a permanent solution to this permanent problem. 
Our own experiences, as well as those of other cities, have taught us this is a problem that can 
be solved. We possess the mechanisms, knowledge and creativity required to move toward Per-
manent Affordability. The next step is to find the will to implement these policies so that the 




24 No shading means the program is a city-subsidized rental housing program and was included in the analysis for determining the units that may be at-risk.      Yellow shading reflects homeownership programs.    Gray shading represents state and federal programs.     Brown shading signifies units developed under the Inclusionary program.      Blue shading denotes units under the StoreWorks program.
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     1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total % of mod  % of HPD total         % of total
Mod
7a        991 631 718 512 289 320 185 153 238   287 248 207 378 279 284 174 113 167 120 6294 4.2% 2.68%  2.14%
Article 8a    7328 2404 3433 6722 5103 3531 4202 1974 2482 1454 1320   2650 1504 1435 1407 2244 3117 2236 2709 2660 2438 62353 41.8% 26.53%  21.18%
CIP        2631 2481 1787 1525 851 551 306 261 252   108          10753 7.2% 4.58%  3.65%
Community MGMT Program  150 135 371 490 610 435 529 396 145                           3261 2.2% 1.39%  1.11%
HIP    55 15 223 374 406 107 48 74 209 104 255   94 85 68 71 49 48 18 20 37 20 2380 1.6% 1.01%  0.81%
MS8 SRO / OCC   230 72                                         302 0.2% 0.13%  0.10%
MS8 SRO / VAC     25                                         25 0.0% 0.01%  0.01%
Neighborhood Ownership Works              42 588 1077 214   90                   2011 1.3% 0.86%  0.68%
Neighborhood Entrepreneur Program                  218   724 834 533 683 682 679 682 580 455 325 6395 4.3% 2.72%  2.17%
Neighborhood Redevelopment Program                   401   484 544 609 493 421 413 416 325 308 316 4730 3.2% 2.01%  1.61%
PLP    2893 2289 549 735 766 388 490 903 775 717 849   1109 1087 543 444 375 726 656 596 620 470 17980 12.1% 7.65%  6.11%
POMP    1345 983 1163 929 1619 1372 635 27 46                           8119 5.4% 3.45%  2.76%
Primary Prevention Programs                 125 137 60                      322 0.2% 0.14%  0.11%
Revolving Loan Fund      37 38 35 44 10 11 8 14 14   6 4                 221 0.1% 0.09%  0.08%
SCHAP                                51 39 51 62 78 78 51 37 447 0.3% 0.19%  0.15%
Senior HELP       47 175 113 73 27 17 36 18 29   31 44         1       611 0.4% 0.26%  0.21%
Senior HIP        26 42 9       6                           83 0.1% 0.04%  0.03%
SHARE        37 2                                     39 0.0% 0.02%  0.01%
Special DAMP                                     9 25 31 8 5 78 0.1% 0.03%  0.03%
Supportive Housing Loan    90 168 182 508 404 574 565 814 450   93 586 869 660 440 297 382 522 48 559 8211 5.5% 3.49%  2.79%
Woodside on the Move   3 2 1   1                                 7 0.0% 0.00%  0.00%
Neighborhood Homes                               15 37 54 119 152 63 104 227 771 0.5% 0.33%  0.26%
NHS    74 165 83 48 70 82 83 19 70 19 22   25 20 28 101 64 68 73 84 85 80 1363 0.9% 0.58%  0.46%
NHS Home Improvement       2 20 78 72 35 23 38 42 32   46 59 167 80 11 12      1 718 0.5% 0.31%  0.24%
TIL    696 411 348 957 1405 871 526 501 611 583 619   512 468 352 316 346 340 292 300 311 272 11037 7.4% 4.70%  3.75%
Section 312   98 53 46 36 57 45 90 59                             484 0.3% 0.21%  0.16%
Total Mod Rehab   12869 6555 10077 13831 12900 9572 8256 5503 6055 5252 5048   6382 5530 4769 4796 5085 6173 5197 5421 4854 4870 148995 100.0% 63.40%  50.61%
                                                   
Gut                                                  % of gut % of HPD total        % of total
85/85                                              42 42 0.1% 0.02%  0.01%
Auction Loan Program / VAC            5                                 5 0.0% 0.00%  0.00%
Bradhurst Rental                 272 98 67 15     67                 519 1.0% 0.22%  0.18%
Brooklyn Ecumenical           82 31                                 113 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
Capital Jobs   13                                           13 0.0% 0.01%  0.00%
Capital Budget Homeless      149 609 278 49 80   26                           1191 2.3% 0.51%  0.40%
Capital Buildings   69 41                                         110 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
City Homes                 41 99 155 35   141 304 84 79 61 4         1003 1.9% 0.43%  0.34%
Construction MGMT         432 811 114 204                             1561 3.0% 0.66%  0.53%
Enterprise          345 304 472 589 676 155 376 197   201 27   24             3366 6.5% 1.43%  1.14%
Harlem Sealed Bid         2 1 18 4 6                             31 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
HODAG (20 year restriction)      353 23 514                                   890 1.7% 0.38%  0.30%
HODAG / PLP           129 124                                 253 0.5% 0.11%  0.09%
HUD Low Income Tax Credit         74 111                                  185 0.4% 0.08%  0.06%
LES Cross Subsidy             183 63                               246 0.5% 0.10%  0.08%
LISC           603 480 508 675 468 299 295   182 146 12               3668 7.1% 1.56%  1.25%
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC)     393 447 62                                   902 1.7% 0.38%  0.31%
MHANY          52 25 47 66 132 94 125 5   122 75   39 15           797 1.5% 0.34%  0.27%
MS8 SRO / VAC             34 67 87                             188 0.4% 0.08%  0.06%
OOHP    2 8 8 7                                     25 0.0% 0.01%  0.01%
Permanent Housing for Homeless Families           194 193   397   51         45 60           940 1.8% 0.40%  0.32%
Section 8    75 97                                         172 0.3% 0.07%  0.06%
SHARP    3 4 9 13 26 12   1                             68 0.1% 0.03%  0.02%
SIP    66 496 363 750 347 528 704 338 70 57                         3719 7.2% 1.58%  1.26%
SIP NYCHA       267 336 241 423 40 33 116 10                         1466 2.8% 0.62%  0.50%
Small Building Loan Program            137 227 85                         42 59 550 1.1% 0.23%  0.19%
Small Homes                 24 60 119 53   85 108 96 115 113 82 103 75 46 4 1083 2.1% 0.46%  0.37%
Special Housing     12   8 4                                   24 0.0% 0.01%  0.01%
Vacant Building RFP       43 1519 1647 1835 1356 1067 775 526 272   31 10     50 228 136 37 36   9568 18.6% 4.07%  3.25%
Vacant Cluster Program         171 903 1001 30                              2105 4.1% 0.90%  0.72%
Vacant Emergency Repair      420 33 127                                   580 1.1% 0.25%  0.20%
Youth Employment   6 7 8   11 8                                 40 0.1% 0.02%  0.01%
203(k)                                            18 30 48 0.1% 0.02%  0.02%
Bradhurst Condo                       54                       54 0.1% 0.02%  0.02%
Dollar Sales       48 30 47                                   125 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
Habitat for Humanity                                         10     10 0.0% 0.00%  0.00%
Homeworks                           62 112 192 134 240 46 67 99 82 116 1150 2.2% 0.49%  0.39%
Homeworks / 203k                                       12 50 3 23 88 0.2% 0.04%  0.03%
Homeworks / TPT                                       9 13 5 3 30 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
NYCHA Partnership       80 75 339 74 20 276 100 183 137                   180 62 1526 3.0% 0.65%  0.52%
UHAB    24 42 24 65                                     155 0.3% 0.07%  0.05%
HHAP    180 16 54 86 61 223 270 163 126 135 10   19   12       33 82 96   1566 3.0% 0.67%  0.53%
Hope 3                    39 15     40                   94 0.2% 0.04%  0.03%
Housing Trust Fund       29 35 8 18 144 28 70   15   202 58 82 408 67 255 563 414 283 296 2975 5.8% 1.27%  1.01%
Section 202   520 877 349 238 310 795 515 419 431 502 392   66 291 344 171 379 146 189 317 155 335 7741 15.0% 3.29%  2.63%
Section 811   21   44 29 50 10 15   16 21 62     25                 293 0.6% 0.12%  0.10%
Storeworks                              45 27 34 48 16 63 2 11 38 284 0.6% 0.12%  0.10%
Total Gut Rehab   979 1600 2374 5668 6115 6496 6860 4216 2888 2692 1490   1115 1134 837 1049 1033 777 1175 1099 957 1008 51562 100.0% 21.94%  17.51%
25Green shading represents programs that rank in the top 10 for the development of units subsidized by HPD.       Purple shading represents programs that rank in the top 10 for all city-subsidized units.     The dashed line at year 2000 demarks those units that will be at-risk before 2030.    The bold line before 2004 demarks the beginning of the Bloomberg Administration’s New Housing Marketplace Plan.
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TIL    696 411 348 957 1405 871 526 501 611 583 619   512 468 352 316 346 340 292 300 311 272 11037 7.4% 4.70%  3.75%
Section 312   98 53 46 36 57 45 90 59                             484 0.3% 0.21%  0.16%
Total Mod Rehab   12869 6555 10077 13831 12900 9572 8256 5503 6055 5252 5048   6382 5530 4769 4796 5085 6173 5197 5421 4854 4870 148995 100.0% 63.40%  50.61%
                                                   
Gut                                                  % of gut % of HPD total        % of total
85/85                                              42 42 0.1% 0.02%  0.01%
Auction Loan Program / VAC            5                                 5 0.0% 0.00%  0.00%
Bradhurst Rental                 272 98 67 15     67                 519 1.0% 0.22%  0.18%
Brooklyn Ecumenical           82 31                                 113 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
Capital Jobs   13                                           13 0.0% 0.01%  0.00%
Capital Budget Homeless      149 609 278 49 80   26                           1191 2.3% 0.51%  0.40%
Capital Buildings   69 41                                         110 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
City Homes                 41 99 155 35   141 304 84 79 61 4         1003 1.9% 0.43%  0.34%
Construction MGMT         432 811 114 204                             1561 3.0% 0.66%  0.53%
Enterprise          345 304 472 589 676 155 376 197   201 27   24             3366 6.5% 1.43%  1.14%
Harlem Sealed Bid         2 1 18 4 6                             31 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
HODAG (20 year restriction)      353 23 514                                   890 1.7% 0.38%  0.30%
HODAG / PLP           129 124                                 253 0.5% 0.11%  0.09%
HUD Low Income Tax Credit         74 111                                  185 0.4% 0.08%  0.06%
LES Cross Subsidy             183 63                               246 0.5% 0.10%  0.08%
LISC           603 480 508 675 468 299 295   182 146 12               3668 7.1% 1.56%  1.25%
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC)     393 447 62                                   902 1.7% 0.38%  0.31%
MHANY          52 25 47 66 132 94 125 5   122 75   39 15           797 1.5% 0.34%  0.27%
MS8 SRO / VAC             34 67 87                             188 0.4% 0.08%  0.06%
OOHP    2 8 8 7                                     25 0.0% 0.01%  0.01%
Permanent Housing for Homeless Families           194 193   397   51         45 60           940 1.8% 0.40%  0.32%
Section 8    75 97                                         172 0.3% 0.07%  0.06%
SHARP    3 4 9 13 26 12   1                             68 0.1% 0.03%  0.02%
SIP    66 496 363 750 347 528 704 338 70 57                         3719 7.2% 1.58%  1.26%
SIP NYCHA       267 336 241 423 40 33 116 10                         1466 2.8% 0.62%  0.50%
Small Building Loan Program            137 227 85                         42 59 550 1.1% 0.23%  0.19%
Small Homes                 24 60 119 53   85 108 96 115 113 82 103 75 46 4 1083 2.1% 0.46%  0.37%
Special Housing     12   8 4                                   24 0.0% 0.01%  0.01%
Vacant Building RFP       43 1519 1647 1835 1356 1067 775 526 272   31 10     50 228 136 37 36   9568 18.6% 4.07%  3.25%
Vacant Cluster Program         171 903 1001 30                              2105 4.1% 0.90%  0.72%
Vacant Emergency Repair      420 33 127                                   580 1.1% 0.25%  0.20%
Youth Employment   6 7 8   11 8                                 40 0.1% 0.02%  0.01%
203(k)                                            18 30 48 0.1% 0.02%  0.02%
Bradhurst Condo                       54                       54 0.1% 0.02%  0.02%
Dollar Sales       48 30 47                                   125 0.2% 0.05%  0.04%
Habitat for Humanity                                         10     10 0.0% 0.00%  0.00%
Homeworks                           62 112 192 134 240 46 67 99 82 116 1150 2.2% 0.49%  0.39%
Homeworks / 203k                                       12 50 3 23 88 0.2% 0.04%  0.03%
Homeworks / TPT                                       9 13 5 3 30 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
NYCHA Partnership       80 75 339 74 20 276 100 183 137                   180 62 1526 3.0% 0.65%  0.52%
UHAB    24 42 24 65                                     155 0.3% 0.07%  0.05%
HHAP    180 16 54 86 61 223 270 163 126 135 10   19   12       33 82 96   1566 3.0% 0.67%  0.53%
Hope 3                    39 15     40                   94 0.2% 0.04%  0.03%
Housing Trust Fund       29 35 8 18 144 28 70   15   202 58 82 408 67 255 563 414 283 296 2975 5.8% 1.27%  1.01%
Section 202   520 877 349 238 310 795 515 419 431 502 392   66 291 344 171 379 146 189 317 155 335 7741 15.0% 3.29%  2.63%
Section 811   21   44 29 50 10 15   16 21 62     25                 293 0.6% 0.12%  0.10%
Storeworks                              45 27 34 48 16 63 2 11 38 284 0.6% 0.12%  0.10%
Total Gut Rehab   979 1600 2374 5668 6115 6496 6860 4216 2888 2692 1490   1115 1134 837 1049 1033 777 1175 1099 957 1008 51562 100.0% 21.94%  17.51%
Source:  New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Office of Legal Affairs, FOIL Request #557-2008 and HDC Corporate Accomplishments.   
 February 2009. Available at: http://www.nychdc.com/about/ca.html
APPENDIx A (Continued)
294,402 Total Dev btw 1987-2007 
177673 HPD At-Risk at 2037   
56835 HDC At-Risk at 2037
234508 Total At-Risk at 2037  
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No shading means the program is a city-subsidized rental housing program and was included in the analysis for determining the units that may be at-risk. 
Yellow shading reflects homeownership programs.    
Gray shading represents state and federal programs.     
Brown shading signifies units developed under the Inclusionary program.      
Blue shading denotes units under the StoreWorks program.
Green shading represents programs that rank in the top 10 for the development of units subsidized by HPD. 
Purple shading represents programs that rank in the top 10 for all city-subsidized units.
The dashed line at year 2000 demarks those units that will be at-risk before 2030.
The bold line before 2004 demarks the beginning of the Bloomberg Administration’s New Housing Marketplace Plan.
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     1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total % of mod  % of HPD total         % of total
                                                  
New Construction                                             % of new % of HPD total % of total
80/20                                4 135             139 0.4% 0.06%  0.05%
Arverne                                20 60       56 190 248 574 1.7% 0.24%  0.19%
Assisted Living                                       104       104 0.3% 0.04%  0.04%
Mixed Income Rental Program                      98     83             172 156 509 1.5% 0.22%  0.17%
New Neighbors                                         24 4   28 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
Permanent Housing for Homeless Families                                     44       44 0.1% 0.02%  0.01%
Tip 421a        283 124 467 143       46     81 628 423 395 537 104 291 81 409 760 4772 13.8% 2.03%  1.62%
Williamsburg Cross Subsidy              144   94 37 19                       294 0.9% 0.13%  0.10%
Cornerstone (mostly homeownership)                                   331 371 677 605 882 2866 8.3% 1.22%  0.97%
Anchor / Partnership                                 257       427     684 2.0% 0.29%  0.23%
Nehemiah    274 127 266 305 395 115 140 112 168 60 7   82 176 172 224 274 42 134       3073 8.9% 1.31%  1.04%
New Foundations                                     14 84 190 186 215 689 2.0% 0.29%  0.23%
North General Co-Ops                   134     155                     289 0.8% 0.12%  0.10%
NYCHA Partnership                                             62 62 0.2% 0.03%  0.02%
Partnership Homes   174 188 382 655 1484 1523 1106 1118 1575 1026 1206   975 989 748 1030 1043 651 504 920 677 258 18232 52.9% 7.76%  6.19%
HTF Turnkey         21 59 278 178                               536 1.6% 0.23%  0.18%
Section 235   126     180 77                                   383 1.1% 0.16%  0.13%
Section 811                                  21            21 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
DHF / Inclusionary       60 48   32   20         17 19 128 137 78 87 9 8 149 372 1164 3.4% 0.50%  0.40%
Total New Construction  574 315 991 1312 2444 1872 1668 1428 1837 1303 1330   1155 2050 1495 2238 1932 1250 1541 2383 2392 2953 34463 100.0% 14.66%  11.71%
                                                        0
HDC PROGRAMS                                                 % of HDC total      % of total
ML Preservation                                       4549 4549 4549 4548 18,195   30.64%  6.18%
NewHOP                        552   552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 6,075 31534 10.23%  2.06%
LAMP                        1864   1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 20,502 16198 34.53%  6.96%
Mixed Income Rental Program                                 452    452 452 452 452 2,260   3.81%  0.77%
80/20    467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467   467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 9,800 392 16.50%  3.33%
Cooperative Housing Program                                      638 638 637 637 2,550   4.29%  0.87%
                                                 59,382   100.00%  20.17%
                                                
Total For Year (HPD)   14889 8931 13909 21278 21926 18407 17251 11614 11247 9714 10451   11535 11597 9984 10966 10933 11535 16434 17424 16724 17351 294402   
                         
SUMMARY                        
                         
Homeownership   1242 933 1231 2137 3760 2743 1947 2061 2547 2043 2087   1688 1966 1564 2266 2101 1622 2348 3471 2893 2868 45517 Homeownership (HPD+HDC)   
State / Federal Programs  945 946 522 604 584 1150 1312 847 682 673 479   327 374 438 579 446 422 785 813 534 631 14093 State / Federal Programs   
Inclusionary       60 48   32   20         17 19 128 137 78 87 9 8 149 372 1164 Inclusionary    
HPD At-Risk   12235 6591 11629 18022 17115 14015 13525 8219 7551 6531 5302   6620 6310 4942 5067 5377 6053 5346 5247 5253 5559 177673 HPD At-Risk (at 2037)    
HDC At-Risk   467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 2883   2883 2883 2883 2883 2883 3335 7884 7884 7884 7883 56835 HDC At-Risk (at 2037)    
Total At-Risk   12702 7058 12156 18537 17582 14514 13992 8706 8018 6998 8185   9520 9212 7953 8087 8338 9475 13239 13139 13286 13814 234508 Total At-Risk (at 2037)    
Lost    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 45 27 34 48 16 63 2 11 38 284 Lost    
Total Subsidized (HPD & HDC)  14889 8937 13909 21278 21926 18407 17251 11614 11247 9714 10751   11535 11552 9955 10932 10885 11519 16371 17422 16713 17313 294402 Total Developed % of HPD / HDC   
% of HPD and HDC At Risk  85.3% 79.0% 87.0% 86.9% 80.2% 78.7% 81.1% 74.8% 71.3% 72.0% 76.1%   82.4% 79.6% 78.6% 72.7% 75.9% 84.4% 83.1% 79.3% 82.2% 82.7% 79.66% units btw 1987-2007 that are at-risk
                                 
                                                   
     
Source:  New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Office of Legal Affairs, FOIL Request #557-2008 and HDC Corporate Accomplishments.   
 February 2009. Available at: http://www.nychdc.com/about/ca.html
294,402 Total HPD and HDC 1987-2007      
155132 Total City At-Risk Rental at 2030 (No Homeownership, No Fed / State, and No Storeworks) 
234508 Total City At-Risk Rental at 2037 (No Homeownership, No Fed / State, and No Storeworks)
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     1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total % of mod  % of HPD total         % of total
                                                  
New Construction                                             % of new % of HPD total % of total
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Arverne                                20 60       56 190 248 574 1.7% 0.24%  0.19%
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New Neighbors                                         24 4   28 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
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Williamsburg Cross Subsidy              144   94 37 19                       294 0.9% 0.13%  0.10%
Cornerstone (mostly homeownership)                                   331 371 677 605 882 2866 8.3% 1.22%  0.97%
Anchor / Partnership                                 257       427     684 2.0% 0.29%  0.23%
Nehemiah    274 127 266 305 395 115 140 112 168 60 7   82 176 172 224 274 42 134       3073 8.9% 1.31%  1.04%
New Foundations                                     14 84 190 186 215 689 2.0% 0.29%  0.23%
North General Co-Ops                   134     155                     289 0.8% 0.12%  0.10%
NYCHA Partnership                                             62 62 0.2% 0.03%  0.02%
Partnership Homes   174 188 382 655 1484 1523 1106 1118 1575 1026 1206   975 989 748 1030 1043 651 504 920 677 258 18232 52.9% 7.76%  6.19%
HTF Turnkey         21 59 278 178                               536 1.6% 0.23%  0.18%
Section 235   126     180 77                                   383 1.1% 0.16%  0.13%
Section 811                                  21            21 0.1% 0.01%  0.01%
DHF / Inclusionary       60 48   32   20         17 19 128 137 78 87 9 8 149 372 1164 3.4% 0.50%  0.40%
Total New Construction  574 315 991 1312 2444 1872 1668 1428 1837 1303 1330   1155 2050 1495 2238 1932 1250 1541 2383 2392 2953 34463 100.0% 14.66%  11.71%
                                                        0
HDC PROGRAMS                                                 % of HDC total      % of total
ML Preservation                                       4549 4549 4549 4548 18,195   30.64%  6.18%
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80/20    467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467   467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 9,800 392 16.50%  3.33%
Cooperative Housing Program                                      638 638 637 637 2,550   4.29%  0.87%
                                                 59,382   100.00%  20.17%
                                                
Total For Year (HPD)   14889 8931 13909 21278 21926 18407 17251 11614 11247 9714 10451   11535 11597 9984 10966 10933 11535 16434 17424 16724 17351 294402   
                         
SUMMARY                        
                         
Homeownership   1242 933 1231 2137 3760 2743 1947 2061 2547 2043 2087   1688 1966 1564 2266 2101 1622 2348 3471 2893 2868 45517 Homeownership (HPD+HDC)   
State / Federal Programs  945 946 522 604 584 1150 1312 847 682 673 479   327 374 438 579 446 422 785 813 534 631 14093 State / Federal Programs   
Inclusionary       60 48   32   20         17 19 128 137 78 87 9 8 149 372 1164 Inclusionary    
HPD At-Risk   12235 6591 11629 18022 17115 14015 13525 8219 7551 6531 5302   6620 6310 4942 5067 5377 6053 5346 5247 5253 5559 177673 HPD At-Risk (at 2037)    
HDC At-Risk   467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 2883   2883 2883 2883 2883 2883 3335 7884 7884 7884 7883 56835 HDC At-Risk (at 2037)    
Total At-Risk   12702 7058 12156 18537 17582 14514 13992 8706 8018 6998 8185   9520 9212 7953 8087 8338 9475 13239 13139 13286 13814 234508 Total At-Risk (at 2037)    
Lost    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 45 27 34 48 16 63 2 11 38 284 Lost    
Total Subsidized (HPD & HDC)  14889 8937 13909 21278 21926 18407 17251 11614 11247 9714 10751   11535 11552 9955 10932 10885 11519 16371 17422 16713 17313 294402 Total Developed % of HPD / HDC   
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Department of Housing Preservation and Development  (HPD)
Article 8a Loan Program
The Article 8a Loan Program provides low-interest loans to preserve affordability, to cor-
rect sub-standard or unsanitary conditions, and to prolong the useful life of multiple dwell-
ings. The scope of work is usually limited to the upgrading or replacement of major build-
ing systems. The program requires that participating buildings be affordable to low-income 
tenants and rents must be stabilized or controlled. Maximum subsidy is $35,000 per unit. 
The loan term maxes out at 30 years or the useful life of the improvements, whichever is 
less. Prepayment is prohibited only for the first five years of the loan.
 
Total Number of Units: 62,353
 % of HPD Units: 26.53% 
 % of Total City Units: 21.18%
Participation Loan Program (PLP)
PLP provides low-interest loans to private owners to rehabilitate housing that is generally 
occupied by low- to moderate-income households. HPD provides funds at 1 percent interest. 
HPD puts in up to $100,000 per unit. Maximum loan term is 30 years. 
 Total Number of Units: 17,980 
 % of HPD Units: 7.65% 
 % of Total City Units: 6.11%
Vacant Building Program
The Vacant Building Program was one of Mayor Koch’s first major initiatives as part of the 
Ten-Year Plan. Buildings were transferred in clusters to private developers for $1 each. 
City subsidies, in the form of 1 percent interest rate mortgages, were capped at approxi-
mately $37,000 per unit and combined with below-market loans. Rents were set in consul-
tation with HPD to be affordable to low-, moderate- and middle-income households.  
 Total Number of Units: 9,568 
 % of HPD Units: 4.07% 
 % of Total City Units: 3.25% 
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Supportive Housing Loan Program
The Supportive Housing Loan Program makes loans to not-for-profit sponsors to develop perma-
nent housing with onsite social services for people with special needs. Loans, which may be up to 
$90,000 per unit, have a 30-year term and neither principal nor interest are repaid if the sponsor 
complies with the terms of a regulatory agreement. All units are affordable to persons earning 60 
percent or less of Area Median Income. Projects may be new construction or rehab, and on city- or 
privately-owned land. Supportive Housing Loan projects are not likely to be at-risk of losing their 
affordability given the role not-for-profit ownership plays and the low probability of turning special 
needs housing into market-rate units.
 Total Number of Units: 8,211 
 % of HPD Units: 3.49% 
 % of Total City Units: 2.79% 
HPD / LISC / Enterprise Low Income Housing Tax Credit Production Program
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Demonstration program was the precursor to the Neigh-
borhood Redevelopment Program described below. In the demonstration program, the city sold 
a vacant property to a not-for-profit housing organization for $1. The city, along with LISC and 
Enterprise, then provided the not-for-profit with predevelopment and working capital in the form 
of grants and low-interest loans. Construction and mortgage financing was in large part provided 
by the city, with tax credit equity generated from the syndication of tax credits helping to defray 
some of the financing costs. Because tax credits were utilized, units were reserved for households 
earning below 60% of Area Median Income.  A 30 year regulatory agreement governed the use and 
affordability of these units. 
 
Total Number of Units: 7,034 
 % of HPD Units: 2.99% 
 % of Total City Units: 2.39%
Neighborhood Entrepreneur Program (NEP)
The NEP program conveys clusters of occupied and vacant city-owned buildings to selected local 
real estate companies for rehabilitation and operation as rental housing. Buildings selected for 
NEP are sold to the Neighborhood Partnership HDFC, a subsidiary of the Enterprise Foundation, 
for $1 each and then leased to the entrepreneurs. The properties are eligible for federal LIHTC and 
local real property tax abatements to reduce development and operating costs. Proceeds from the 
sale of LIHTC provide for a portion of the capital needs, as well as the operating and social service 
needs of the project.  Construction financing is provided by commercial banks. HPD provides per-
manent financing at a cost of approximately $120,000 per unit.
 Total Number of Units: 6,395 
 % of HPD Units: 2.72% 
 % of Total City Units: 2.17%
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Neighborhood Redevelopment Program (NRP)
Similar in structure to the NEP program, NRP transfers clusters of occupied and vacant city-
owned buildings to new owners—community-based not-for-profit organizations—for rehabilitation 
and operation as rental housing. HPD finances rehabilitation at a cost of approximately $120,000 
per unit. Equity is also generated through the sale of Tax Credits. All units are subject to rent 
stabilization. 
 
Total Number of Units: 4,703 
 % of HPD Units: 2.01% 
 % of Total City Units: 1.61%
Housing Development Corporation (HDC)
LAMP
The LAMP program allows for the new construction or rehabilitation of affordable housing for 
households earning up to 60 percent of Area Median Income. Typically, at least 10 percent of the 
units are reserved for homeless households.
Financing for the LAMP program combines a first mortgage, funded through proceeds from the 
sale of tax-exempt bonds, with a second mortgage, provided through HDC corporate reserves, 4 
percent Federal Low Income Housing Tax Credits, and other subsides. HDC’s second mortgage is 
a subordinate loan of up to $55,000 per unit at 1 percent interest. 
This HDC subsidy is often coupled with subsidies from HPD or with loans provided by the New 
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) through its Homes for Working 
Families Program. The term for the first mortgage is 30 years and up to 30 years for the second 
mortgage.  
Total Number of Units: 20,502
 % of HDC Units: 34.53% 
 % of Total City Units: 6.96% 
Mitchell-Lama Preservation Program
There are two components to the Mitchell-Lama Preservation Program: the Repair Loan Program 
and the Mortgage Restructuring Program.
The goal of Repair Loan Program is to protect tenants and ensure long-term affordability by in-
centivizing owners to remain in the program in exchange for low-cost financing, which is used for 
capital repairs. There is pre-payment penalty of 5 percent if a loan is prepaid within the first 10 
years of loan closing. After this period, there is no prepayment penalty. Borrowers must commit to 
remaining in the Mitchell-Lama program for the duration of the term of the loan (approximately 
15 to 18 years) or a minimum of 10 years. 
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The Mortgage Restructuring Program allows owners and co-ops to restructure their existing HDC 
first and second mortgages. Refinancing allows owners or co-ops to reduce their debt service pay-
ments and/or receive funds to repair their property. Mortgages are refinanced with a 30-year term, 
but owners must remain in the Mitchell-Lama program for only an additional 15 years.
Total Number of Units: 18,195 
 % of HDC Units: 30.64% 
 % of Total City Units: 6.18% 
80 / 20
Through its 80 / 20 program, HDC issues taxable bonds to make construction and/or permanent 
mortgage loans for projects where at least 20 percent of the units are affordable to low- and moder-
ate-income households earning up to 80 percent of the city’s median income. The remaining units 
may be set at market levels and rented to households of any income. 
This is a deviation from HDC’s historical 80 / 20 program which made loans financed with the pro-
ceeds of tax-exempt bonds. To make the deals work, HDC offers subsidies in the form of a second 
mortgage of up to $85,000 per affordable unit. Subsidy funds are advanced at a 1 percent interest 
rate. The term for the first mortgage is 30 years, and up to 30 years for the second mortgage. Bor-
rowers are required to enter into a Regulatory Agreement.
 
      Total Number of Units: 9,800
  % of HDC Units: 16.50% 
 % of Total City Units: 3.33% 
New Housing Opportunities Program (New HOP)
New HOP builds or renovates multifamily rental housing for moderate- and middle-income house-
holds earning up to 130 percent AMI.  Financing includes a first mortgage, funded through pro-
ceeds from the sale of taxable bonds, coupled with a second mortgage, provided through HDC 
corporate reserves. 
The second mortgage provides up to $85,000 per unit at 1 percent for the affordable units in the de-
velopment. The term for the first mortgage is 30 years, and up to 30 years for the second mortgage. 
 
Total Number of Units: 6,075  
 % of HDC Units: 10.23% 
 % of Total City Units: 2.06%
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